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Symposium:
Judicial Professionalism in a
New Era of Judicial Selection
October 22, 2004
Session One: Recent Changes in
the Law of Judicial Elections
Good morning and welcome. My name is Daisy
DEAN FLOYD:
Floyd. I serve as Dean here at Mercer University's Walter F. George
School of Law. I am delighted to welcome you to Macon, to Mercer, and
to our law school for this important and timely topic of Judicial
Professionalism in a New Era of Judicial Selection.
This Symposium is jointly sponsored by the law school's Center for
Legal Ethics and Professionalism and the Mercer Law Review. You will
see from the program that today is divided into four different sessions,
the first of those focusing on recent developments in the law surrounding
judicial elections. Sessions two and three have to do with ways in which
we can improve the selection of judges, and the fourth session is on
exploring alternatives to the election of judges. It promises to be
informative and provocative, and I am delighted that you are here to
share in this experience.
I am going to turn the podium over to Professor Patrick Longan.
Professor Longan is the William Augustus Bootle Chair in Ethics and
Professionalism at Mercer, and he has been the driving force behind
putting together today's program. So, again, welcome, and here is
Professor Longan.
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PROFESSOR LONGAN: Thank you for coming. As you see, the
subject for our Symposium today is Judicial Professionalism in a New
Era of Judicial Selection. That new era is the result of some recent
cases involving the First Amendment rights of judicial candidates to
speak about issues as part of judicial campaigns.
For many years there have been special rules about what judicial
candidates can say during campaigns in recognition of the very different
role that judges play in our system of government. Those rules are
changing. With those changes come some new challenges in designing
an effective system of judicial selection. They are changing primarily
because of two cases: Republican Party of Minnesota v. White1 and
Weaver v. Bonner.2 Our first panel this morning is here to discuss these
recent cases and their implications for judicial campaigning.
Our speakers in the first panel are Barbara Reed, who is with us all
the way from Roswell, New Mexico. Barbara is a consultant to The
Constitution Project, an organization based at Georgetown University
that is devoted, among other things, to public education and advocacy on
the importance of judicial independence. Barbara will be discussing
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.
Joining Barbara on the panel are Eric Schroeder and Cheryl Custer.
Cheryl is the Executive Director of the Georgia Judicial Qualifications
Commission ("JQC"), which is one of the parties in Weaver v. Bonner.
Eric is a partner at Powell, Goldstein in Atlanta, and was counsel to the
Judicial Qualifications Commission in Weaver v. Bonner. They will be
discussing Weaver and its implications.
MS. REED: Thank you. This is exciting for us to see this level of
interest out in the various states.
I do a lot of work with the National Center for State Courts, and focus
my work on the issues surrounding Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White and the trends in judicial election law that surround it. It is
always exciting to see that states are taking the initiative to resolve
these problems on their own, and certainly here in Georgia you have
made great progress despite some very nasty campaigns and some less
than helpful decisions.
We have a PowerPoint presentation that was done for the National
Center for State Courts back in February. We had a workshop in Dallas
and Judge Studdard and Eric and a few other people from Georgia
attended to learn more about these kinds of issues. And I will not
subject you to the entire PowerPoint as it is rather lengthy, but there

1.
2.

536 U.S. 765 (2002).
309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002).
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are a few major points throughout that highlight how we got here, what
White actually said, what the implications are, and possibilities about
where we go from here.
One of the first things that I always begin with, and my apologies for
those of you who have heard me say this a gazillion times, but I always
go back to the surveys that are done of the general public. Back in 1998,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did a survey that found that 89
percent of the respondents, and this is a direct quote, "believed that
money buys judicial favor most, some, or all of the time."
In 1999, according to a poll done by the Texas Supreme Court in
conjunction with the Texas State Bar, 69 percent of court employees and
79 percent of lawyers believed that campaign contributions significantly
influenced judges' decisions. Forty-eight percent of the Texas judges also
believed that campaign contributions significantly influenced judges'
decisions. And I am sure Chief Justice Phillips can provide plenty of
insight into what Texas judges actually believe to be the case or know
to be the case. In 1999, according to the National Center for State
Courts, roughly 80 percent of respondents believed that campaign
contributions and politics generally influence judges.
We have, over and over and over again, poll after poll after poll, found
that the general public believes that if you make a contribution to a
judge who is running for office, that contribution is going to buy you not
just access but the decision that you want. As a practical matter, I do
not think that it buys you 'much of anything, but what we have to deal
with is the perception, and that is where decisions like White have made
life so difficult for all of you.
Really, in looking at the law, this began with a case in Michigan called
In re Chmura.3 In Chmura we had a state court judge who ran in
Macomb County. I do not know how many of you are familiar with the
state of Michigan and its internal politics. This was back in the early
1990s.
Macomb County is a suburb of Detroit. It is an extremely conservative
county, and at that time Coleman Young was Mayor of the City of
Detroit. He was not popular with anyone outside of the Detroit city
limits. A particular judicial candidate named Chmura ran a series of
ads and distributed a series of fliers that were, among other things,
appeals to people's baser reactions. Coleman Young is African-American,
and the picture on the front of the flier was a caricature, to put it kindly,
that blamed Young for a variety of sins and implied that in some way,

3.

464 Mich. 58 (Mich. 2001).
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shape, or form, if Chmura were elected to the Court he could do
something about it.
Chmura was disciplined by the state disciplinary body, and he went
to the Michigan Supreme Court and sued saying that the disciplinary
action violated his First Amendment 4 rights. The court agreed. At the
time this seemed to be a blip on the radar screen. I remember reading
about it when the decision came down, and there did not really seem to
be any fallout.
Then we get to the late 1990s, and we have Gregory Wersal in
Minnesota, and he laid the foundation for RepublicanParty of Minnesota
v. White. Just quickly for those of you who do not really know the
background of the case, Greg Wersal had run for state supreme court
several times. He had lost several times. He wanted to be able to
campaign the way politicians campaign for legislative and executive
branch races. The state supreme court races were non-partisan. They
were not supposed to solicit endorsements, accept endorsements, run on
partisan tickets, solicit for personal campaign contributions themselves,
nor engage in other political activity. They were supposed to abide by
the canons of judicial conduct that governed judicial candidates' speech.
At the time, we had in Minnesota what has become known as the
"Announce Clause." In 1972 the American Bar Association created the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct. The Model Code provided that judicial
candidates shall not "announce their views on disputed legal or political
issues." The thinking was that if they discussed their personal political
views, for example, whether they were for or against abortion, whether
they were for or against the death penalty, whether they were for or
against tort reform, etc., they ran the risk of coloring their decisions, but
more likely they ran the risk of coloring how the public perceived those
decisions.
It is a little hard to believe that you have received a fair trial when
the judge presiding over your case has taken a very public stand that
actually supports your opponent's position, has done so in advance, and
has, indeed, campaigned on that stand. So we had states all over the
country adopting this version of the Model Code.
By 1990 it was clear that the language was overly broad, and it had
been changed to what we call either the "Pledges or Promises Clause" or
the "Commit Clause." In other words, that narrowed it to say that
judicial candidates should not in some way commit themselves to taking
certain courses of action as judges, or should not pledge or promise to

4.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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engage in certain courses of action, or achieve certain ends other than
the faithful performance of their duties on the bench.
That had always seemed very reasonable to most of us. And, in fact,
virtually all of the states had some form of that code in their own local
codes of conduct. However, a few states, nine I believe, still retained the
old "Announce Clause" language, and Minnesota was one of those states.
Minnesota was not construing the language broadly. They were
construing it as though it read pledges or promises or commit, but,
nonetheless, the language actually still said that judicial candidates
shall not announce their views.
Wersal sued and it went to the Minnesota Supreme Court and then
eventually went to federal court. In 2002 it was heard by the United
States Supreme Court. With White we had one of the most confusing
and appalling Supreme Court decisions that I think I have ever read.
Of course, I probably think that because this is something that is close
to my heart and something that I do professionally all the time. But all
the same, I was shocked at the amount of personal opinion that
appeared in the decision that people have now seized on as somehow
representing the holding rather than simple dicta.
At the outset of the decision in White, Justice Scalia, who wrote the
opinion, declared that the Court would take no position on the pledges
or promises clauses or the commit clauses because those issues were not
before the Court.5 Right there you have that sort of language taken out
of the mix for purposes of White. This was intended just to address
specifically the very broad announce clause language.
I am not going to go into any detail into Justice Scalia's analysis of
impartiality and open-mindedness, and how this factors into judicial
independence, or perhaps in his opinion, does not factor into it. For
anyone who wants details on that, we certainly have plenty of materials.
I have outlines and so forth that have been done for the National Center
that address these issues in detail. But the upshot is that he believed
that the case was not made that judicial independence requires such
broad language, that it did not pass the strict scrutiny test, so that
language was overturned.
Now, what that means for us after White is that we have a whole
array of misconceptions on all sides of the fence. Some candidates think,
"Well, I can say anything I want now." No, that's not true. Other
candidates still think, "Well, but I really can't say anything so I'm just
not going to say anything at all. I'm not going to respond to questions,

5.

White, 536 U.S. at 770.
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I'm not going to talk to the public, and I'm not going to talk to reporters." Personally, I think that is an equally dangerous prohibition.
Perhaps the most insidious effect of this we have seen coming from
this decision is interest groups around the country who have begun to
send questionnaires to judicial candidates on specific sorts of issues.
Tort reform is a very popular one, or "business interests" as they like to
put it. Social issue groups such as the Christian Coalition of Alabama
have been doing this since at least the late 1990s, but it now is cropping
up all over the country. They send questionnaires to judicial candidates
with the idea that their opinions will be printed in the voter guide that
organization decides to distribute before the election.
What is happening now in the aftermath of White is that some of these
groups are sending out these questionnaires with the proviso that White
requires you to answer, which of course is not the case. And if you do
not respond within "X" amount of time, usually a week or so, you will be
reported to the media as having refused to respond. Well, of course, any
political candidate knows that that is a sure way to shoot yourself in the
foot, so we find candidates all over the country now who are faced with
this Hobson's choice, "Do I respond and potentially violate the Canons
of Conduct, or do I not respond and then lose my campaign just on that
issue alone?"
There is now developing a rather significant body of literature
surrounding the questionnaires. We have information on that for people
who want it. And I think with the subsequent panels later today, that
is going to be raised with some of them.
Probably the biggest case that has affected this area of jurisprudence
other than White is Weaver. Because you have the real experts here to
talk about that, I am not going to address Weaver except to say that I
was truly shocked at the Eleventh Circuit's holding. This is a direct
quote from the Eleventh Circuit's opinion: "We agree that the distinction between judicial elections and other types of elections has been
greatly exaggerated, and we do not believe that the distinction, if there
truly is one, justifies greater restrictions on speech during judicial
campaigns than during other types of campaigns."6 They went on to
adopt the actual malice standard for a candidate's speech.
For those of us who work in this field, it is entirely possible that we
have a very blinkered sort of approach to this and we think it will be
easy for us to regard these things as more important than they actually
are. But I have yet to talk to a practitioner, a lawyer, a judge, or a
policy specialist in this field who believes that there is no distinction

6.

Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1321.
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between judicial elections and other types of elections or who believes
that that distinction is not a very great one.
I really found this outrageous, and what I hear from state judges and
state lawyers is that this represents the divide between the federal
judges and the state judges. The federal judges are insulated from these
sort of problems because they do not have to run for office and they just
do not get it. That is a complaint I hear over and over.
Later today, Mike Sweeney from New York, who was counsel to the
Feerick Commission, will be talking to you about a case called Spargo
v. New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct.7 Spargo was
probably the next milestone in this area, and I will run through it
briefly.
Tom Spargo had been a local party official. He headed the county
Republican party for Dutchess County-that is the Poughkeepsie area
for those of you who know New York State-and decided to run for
judge. First, he became a Town Village Justice. Thereafter, he decided
to run for supreme court, which is the trial court of general jurisdiction
in New York. It is not the highest court in the state.
During his campaign he engaged in a variety of behaviors that in
terms of practical effects were de minimis but as a pattern were fairly
egregious. He gave out five-dollar coupons for gasoline to people pulling
into convenience stores saying, "Here, I'm Tom Spargo. I'm running for
Supreme Court Justice, and I'd like your vote." He bought pizza for
county employees. He bought rounds of drinks at the local bar. The
value was probably between one and five dollars on every single thing
he ever gave out. But when you are saying, "I am running for judge and
I would like your vote," that puts a very different color on it.
At the same time, and this was during the 2000 elections, he was part
of the group that went to Florida in the aftermath of the 2000 elections
to demonstrate against the recount. He was part of the group that was
trying to force its way into the offices of the local clerks and prevent the
recount from happening. This action represented another charge against
him engaging in political activity. I imagine there was also some feeling
that it was sort of undermining to the dignity of the office.
While he was a sitting judge he also served as a keynote speaker at
a county party fund raiser. There was a supplemental charge that had
less to do with his public behavior, but involved him making payments
to consultants of various existing political parties for services to his
campaign that had been volunteer services.

7.

244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
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Spargo challenged. He was called before the State Commission on
Judicial Conduct. Before he could even have a hearing, he filed suit in
federal district court. And, boy, we were all shocked when we got the
decision because it appeared that the federal district court judge agreed
with Spargo that this was terrible. Poor Tom Spargo, he cannot get
justice anywhere except in my courtroom. So I am taking this out of the
jurisdiction of the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, and
I am going to decide the case. And my decision is that all of these
sections that he is challenging are unconstitutional and I am issuing an
injunction. They cannot be enforced anymore.
Talk about throwing twenty-seven years of state disciplinary
jurisprudence into an uproar. All of us who work in this area were
getting calls from all over the country saying, "Well, what do we do
now?" Ultimately, the Second Circuit ruled that Judge Hurd should
indeed have abstained, and that it should go to the State Commission on
Judicial Conduct. At last report, Spargo is now having to defend himself
before the Commission on the specifics of these charges, and then it can
go up the ladder.
In anticipation of that ruling by the Second Circuit, the New York
Court of Appeals decided two local cases-and in New York the court of
appeals is the highest court-In re Watson" and In re Raab.9 The court
made it very clear from the decision, and from the language that was
used, that it was anticipating a Second Circuit decision in Spargo. The
court also wanted to make it clear that (1) the Commission did have the
power to address the constitutional issues, (2) that whatever the holding
of the Commission, the court of appeals would review it as of right if
requested to do so, and (3) that there was an automatic right of appeal,
which also included very specific and very explicit language on the
significance, and the compelling state interest that the state has in
insuring judicial independence in this way. I fully expect that, whatever
the outcome of the Commission ruling in Spargo, this will go back to
Federal Court.
We have had two very recent decisions in Kentucky. Their federal
district court judge just held that there is no relationship between the
speech restrictions regarding committing or appearing to commit oneself
to a particular decision or course of action, or pledges or promises to do
so, indicating that there was no relationship between such restrictions
and judicial independence.'°

8.
9.
10.

100 N.Y.2d 290 (N.Y. 2003).
100 N.Y.2d 305 (N.Y. 2003).
Family Trust Found. of Ky. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004).
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The decision in White has been back before the Eighth Circuit in
Minnesota for rehearing on the political activity issues. I believe that
hearing was two days ago, so we do not have a decision, but I am told
that the two issues up for consideration were political activity by judicial
candidates or sitting judges and personal solicitation. I am also told
that the personal solicitation issue generated absolutely no interest by
the bench and was not addressed by the lawyers in oral argument. The
political activity apparently is going to be the next big thing.
I think we are going to see challenges on a broader scale, not just to
restrictions on speech, but to restrictions of any kind on any sort of
political activity by judges and judicial candidates. We are also going to
see challenges to commit clauses or pledges or promises clauses, which
are already starting to crop up across the country. That is where we are
in terms of the broader picture, and certainly my colleagues can give you
the specifics of what is probably of much more immediate importance
and interest to you, which is the Weaver case.
PROFESSOR LONGAN: Thank you, Barbara. Cheryl and Eric, I am
going to turn the discussion over to you and allow the two of you to
decide the order in which you would like to proceed.
MS. CUSTER: I am going to do a little background on how we got
into court, and then Eric is going to talk about being the losing lawyer.
I am just the client.
In Georgia, 1996 was also a campaign year, and there was an
incredible interest in judicial campaigns, and most particularly a very
hotly contested, shocking campaign for some court of appeals positions.
If you live here in Georgia, perhaps you have noticed that there are some
other court of appeals positions that are [hotly contested]. These must
be great jobs that people really want. But, nonetheless, in 1996 there
was a campaign for the court of appeals. That was the first time that
so much television advertising and other mass media productions
occurred.
During that time period, the JQC rendered an enormous amount of
opinions, which we are allowed to do, interpreting our Canon 7 that
occurred at that time of judicial conduct in response to all of the issues
that were being addressed. After that campaign was over, it became
clear to the supreme court, (the Commission is an independent body
created by the Constitution of Georgia of the Georgia Supreme Court),
that perhaps we should revisit our election Canon and the rules
concerning how we implement our election Canon.
A blue ribbon panel was created by the supreme court. The panel held
town hall meetings, there was extensive lawyer input, and the result of
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those meetings were what we referred to as the new Canon 711 and the
new Rule 27,12 which were implemented in January of 1998, just in
time for the 1998 elections.
Appellate judges in Georgia, for those of you who do not know, serve
six year terms, so they are quite staggered on our election cycle. We call
all our election cycles in Georgia either a gubernatorial cycle or a
presidential cycle. We are obviously presently in a presidential cycle for
our elections this year.
Because there was a new canon, there was a lot of training done, we
compared our system to other states, there was extensive input, and we
thought this was an excellent new bit of information that we provided.
The supreme court felt and the Commission felt that judicial elections
were different from regular elections, and they still feel that way.
Part of the Canon did discuss advertising, what you can and cannot
say in advertising, and what you should and should not say in advertising. One of the contested races was for the supreme court at that time.
There were three candidates: the sitting Justice, Leah Sears, and her
two challengers, George Weaver and William Ames.
Justice Sears raised a considerable amount of money and began to
advertise with these two challengers, and Mr. Weaver also began to
advertise. He began running television ads in the metropolitan Atlanta
area on all of our cable programs and stations. He also had print media.
I was not the Executive Director of the JQC during the 1998 election.
I was losing my own election for district attorney that summer, so I was
quite busy with my own campaigning to put people in jail for as long as
possible, but, which apparently does not sell as well as it did in other
places.
A complaint was filed with the JQC. Let me now give you a tiny bit
of background. The Commission consists of seven members. They are
seven volunteers who live all over the state of Georgia. The makeup of
the Commission is chosen by our constitution. I'm proud to say Georgia
has had a JQC since 1973. Right after the Model Rules came out of the
Code, Georgia created a Code of Judicial Conduct and created the
Commission to accept complaints immediately thereafter. The Commission makeup is three lawyers who must be trial lawyers and must have
a minimum of ten years of trial experience. They are appointed by the
State Bar of Georgia, and we have a mandatory Bar in Georgia. We also
have two judges that serve on the Commission. They are appointed by
the supreme court and they must be judges of courts of record. This is
much to the chagrin of our lower judges, who are not judges of courts of

11.

GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7.

12.

GA. JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS CoMM'N Rule 27.
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record and who make up the majority of our judges in Georgia. We also
have two lay members who are appointed by the Governor of Georgia,
and they must not be lawyers or judges or have legal experience. The
staff of the Commission is myself, or an executive director position. At
present, we have a full-time investigator and a part-time secretary.
An election complaint was filed with the Commission by some
supporters of Justice Sears alleging that George Weaver's campaign
information was in violation of Canon 7, and that steps should be taken
to prevent him from advertising the way that he was advertising.
Does that take you up to a good point where you can pick up on it?
MR. SCHROEDER: Yes.
MS. CUSTER: Okay. I am going to let Eric talk again and then I will
tell you what we did after the Eleventh Circuit ruled.
MR. SCHROEDER: Good morning. We have been talking about the
Canon, and I just want to first put forward what the actual Canon at
issue was. When the Commission took a look at Canon 7, which rules
what sort of speech a judicial candidate can be disciplined for once they
took office, it was felt that it was not strong nor specific enough to
prevent the sort of speech-false and misleading speech-that they felt
was not appropriate in judicial elections.
Canon 7(1)(B)(2) was changed to prohibit judges and judicial
candidates from issuing speech that
the candidate knows or reasonably should know is false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive or contains a material misrepresentation of fact
or law or omits a fact necessary to make the communication considered
as a whole not materially misleading or which is likely to create an
unjustified expectation about the results the candidate can achieve.
That is essentially the common law standard for libel as it existed before
1964 and the United States Supreme Court's decision in New York Times
v. Sullivan,13 which forever changed the landscape by imputing a First
Amendment aspect into libel. The decision in Sullivan required for
speech about public figures---or arguably about public issues-a standard
of "actual malice," which is, speakers can only be held liable for speech
when they know the speech is false or they recklessly disregard the
falsity of that speech before uttering it.
Essentially what is happening here is that Georgia is holding their
judges to a higher standard of ethics, and saying that, "We know the

13.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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First Amendment only requires actual malice, but because you are
judges, because you are different than other political candidates, we are
going to hold you to a higher standard and hold you to the common law
principle of negligence."
MS. CUSTER: This Canon covers all judicial candidates, not just
sitting judges, including lawyers who want to be a judge.
MR. SCHROEDER: There was also another canon in this case at
issue, Canon 7(b)(2), which prohibited candidates from personally
soliciting monetary contributions and statements of public support.
Additionally, and this was the most novel addition by Georgia, a Rule 27
Special Committee was created to address perceived campaign abuses
during a campaign season. The Rule 27 Committee was made up of
three JQC members, with the chairman as an ex officio member, who
would receive complaints during a judicial campaign.
The procedure by which this Committee worked is that they would
receive a complaint, initially investigate it, and question whether it
merited more investigation. If so, they contacted the candidate and
asked for an explanation for the ad. If that explanation made sense and
they deemed the ad acceptable, the process was over, and the decision
was kept confidential. If they decided that the explanation was not
sufficient and that the ad violated the Canon, they sent a cease and
desist request requesting the candidate to please stop the current ads.
This, too, was confidential.
The only enforcement mechanism that the Rule 27 Special Committee
had if the false or misleading speech continued was that they were able
to issue a public statement in which they would identify the ad, identify
the candidate, and speak on the violation of the Canon. The Special
Committee had no official disciplinary power. All they could do was
refer whatever findings they had to the JQC or the state bar, if
applicable. Those findings would have no official weight.
In May 1998, Mr. Weaver positioned himself to the right of the
political spectrum. He was the conservative candidate for judge. He
painted his rival, the incumbent, Justice Leah Sears, as the liberal
judge. Again, Mr. Ames was not really a factor except that he was
blessed with a last name that began with "A." I think Barbara will tell
you that there are studies that show that if you are first on the ballot,
you immediately get fifteen percent of the vote. So, if I ever run for
judge, I am considering changing my name to Aaron Aardvark, and in
Georgia I would probably have my middle name "a Republican."
When Mr. Weaver started his campaign, he hired a political advisor
who told him that he needed to get out there quickly because it was a
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judicial campaign and nobody pays attention. He needed to be hard
hitting. He needed to grab the attention of the masses.
The first brochure from Mr. Weaver that was distributed had three
main points. It had a picture of Mr. Weaver and a picture of Justice
Sears. Underneath Justice Sears's photo was the following: "She would
require the State to license same sex marriages. She has referred to
traditional moral standards as, 'pathetic and disgraceful.' Justice Sears
has called the electric chair silly." Underneath that quote was the term,
"the death penalty." Under each of those statements was a case citation
or a citation to a newspaper interview.
There were several complaints filed. The JQC investigated and found
that the case citations simply did not support the statements made.
They sent a letter requesting an explanation or a justification from Mr.
Weaver's campaign. They received a seven- to eight-page letter that
attacked the JQC's right to even inquire, and that also made an effort
to justify the ads. The justifications were not considered persuasive, and
a cease and desist request was sent to the Weaver campaign.
At that point, Mr. Weaver threatened to file a federal lawsuit
immediately. A day or two after that, he agreed to comply with the
cease and desist request. A new brochure was distributed that changed
some of the language. There were no complaints filed with the JQC
about that second brochure at that point, so there was really no reason
for the JQC to get involved.
In late June 1998, Mr. Weaver began airing his television ads. His
television ads showed Justice Sears and then a narrator said: "What
does Justice Leah Sears stand for? Same sex marriage." Underneath
was a graphic with "same sex marriage," and again the same case
citations that were in the brochure. The narrator then stated: "She
questioned the constitutionality of laws prohibiting sex for children
under fourteen." Underneath was a statement that she questioned laws
protecting our children. Finally, the narrator stated: "She has called
the electric chair silly," and this statement had a graphic: "She has
called the electric chair silly."
Now, Justice Sears did say the electric chair is silly. But, she had
voted to uphold the electric chair's constitutionality, and she had always
been in favor of the death penalty. So that statement was deemed by
the JQC to be misleading. As to what Justice Sears stands for-same
sex marriage-there was simply nothing in the case citation cited that
supported that she would require the state to license same sex marriage
or that she stood for or favored same sex marriage.
Several complaints were filed immediately after these television ads
began airing. The JQC Special Committee received these complaints
and, pursuant to Rule 27, they decided that a public statement was
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appropriate. A public statement was drawn up identifying the ads,
identifying Mr. Weaver, and saying that Mr. Weaver had intentionally
violated his promise to cease and desist the ads that he had promised to
stop before.
This public statement was then faxed to seven to twelve media outlets
throughout Georgia, and that was pretty much the end of what the JQC
Special Committee did. They had no other power. They could not
request or order anyone to stop airing the ads, and Weaver did not stop
airing them. They continued to run. Nor could the Committee require
Mr. Weaver to stop speaking, nor could it discipline Mr. Weaver.
The day after the public statement, Mr. Weaver called a press
conference on the steps of the federal courthouse in Atlanta and
announced the filing of his lawsuit. As you can imagine, there was
much rhetoric claiming that the JQC stomped all over Weaver's First
Amendment rights, "They are throwing the election in favor of the
incumbent," etc. My law firm was accused of having a vendetta against
him because lawyers in my firm had given $500 to the incumbent,
Justice Sears.
MS. CUSTER: Members of the Special Committee had also given
donations.
MR. SCHROEDER: Right. My law partner, Jim Rawls, who was the
lead lawyer on this, was accused of partiality because he had given $25
to Justice Sears.
A lawsuit was filed. The election occurred several days later. Now,
Justice Sears used the public statement in some of her ads, so she used
it to her political advantage. We have no way of knowing the effect of
that public statement, the effect of Mr. Weaver's ads, or the effect of Mr.
Weaver's announcement of his lawsuit. But we do know what happened
in the election. In the election, Justice Sears was elected with 54
percent of the vote. Mr. Weaver received approximately 28 percent. The
first name on the ballot received 18 percent.
Shortly after that election, Mr. Weaver amended his complaint, and
I will go through the complaint as it stood at that time. It was a facial
attack on Canon 7(b)(1)(2), which was the common law principles of libel
applied to judicial speech. There was an attack on the prohibitions
against personal solicitations of statements of public support. There was
not an attack on the personal solicitation of monetary contributions.
There was also a facial attack against JQC Rule 27. There were also
several "as applied" attacks stating that the JQC "had it in" for him,
they were protecting incumbents, they were wrong to issue the public
statement, the public statement was libelous, etc.

20051

SYMPOSIUM: SESSION ONE

829

The main complaint also had claims for monetary damages against the
JQC Special Committee, personally, and sought to have the election
overturned. So that's where we were in August. The case was before
Judge Willis B. Hunt, who was formerly of the Georgia Supreme Court,
but was then a federal district court judge in the Northern District of
Georgia based in Atlanta. He is still a federal district court judge there,
and he just announced his senior status.
Early in the case we moved to dismiss the claims of monetary damages
against the individual JQC members on qualified immunity grounds.
That motion to dismiss was granted on the basis that the law on judicial
elections at that time, if not favoring a canon that would hold a judge to
a higher standard because of the difference between judges and
legislators and members of the executive branch, was so unsettled that
no one could reasonably believe that they were acting unconstitutionally
in enforcing such a canon.
In addition, the JQC Special Committee voluntarily narrowed the
application of that Canon when they applied it to Mr. Weaver's ads.
They did not apply the full negligence standard. They narrowed the
Canon and applied the actual malice standard, and they stated so to Mr.
Weaver.
We also moved to dismiss the special election. Nobody was deceived
in the election. All the information was out there. The Special
Committee's public statement followed the axiom that the cure for false
speech is more speech. The voters could decide who was right. So Judge
Hunt agreed with us on that motion and dismissed the claim for a
special election. What we had going forward into discovery were facial
challenges to the Canons, Rule 27, and also the "as applied" challenges.
The case came before Judge Hunt on summary judgment. We won
some and lost some. On Canon 7(b)(1)(d), we argued the JQC could hold
the judges to a higher standard because what they do is fundamentally
different than what legislators and members of the executive branch do.
Those folks are elected to enact promises. Judges are not elected to
enact promises. They are elected to be fair and impartial. Additionally,
the three compelling governmental interests, which I will call the "three
I's" advanced by the Canon were preserving the independence, the
impartiality, and the integrity of Georgia's judiciary.
Justification for the ban on the personal solicitations was the same.
How can citizens be confident in the impartiality, the independence, and
the integrity of our judges if they are asking litigants or lawyers-worst
case scenario in the middle of court-for money to support their
campaign? If it does not create a situation where there is actual
impartiality, it is the appearance of partiality that is damaging to the
judiciary.
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Finally, on JQC Rule 27, the argument boiled down to this: It's just
more speech. The government speaks all the time. The First Amendment is designed to prevent legislative enactments curtailing your
speech as citizens. The government has every right to speak in the
marketplace of ideas as anyone else. The citizens can then decide who
to believe. Executive Branch officials speak, legislators speak, government agencies issue findings, etc. This was nothing different. We had
support for that position from a Sixth Circuit case, Pestrak v. Ohio
Elections Commission,14 which was almost on point.
The other side responded: "This is the First Amendment, the election
is no different than any other, and you cannot do anything within the
confines of a campaign."
Judge Hunt said, in a close decision for him, that Canon 7(b)(1)(d) was
unconstitutional. While he agreed Georgia did have compelling
interests, the negligence standard was just too much. It chilled too
much speech. On JQC Rule 27, he agreed that it was constitutional,
because the correct answer to false speech was not to shut it off, but to
answer it with more speech. Finally, on the personal solicitation canon,
he agreed that the appearance of partiality concerns justified the ban of
personal solicitations.
The case was appealed by both sides to the Eleventh Circuit. We felt
pretty good about Judge Hunt's decision. In fact, we were pretty
optimistic because Judge Hunt said it was a close decision on the
negligence standard, and we might be able to win on appeal. As it turns
out, we were overly optimistic.
On appeal, we drew Judge Tjoflat, Judge Dubina, and a visiting judge
from the Fifth Circuit, Judge Dooley. In oral argument, we knew
something was wrong when counsel for Mr. Weaver excoriated the JQC,
and there was silence from the panel. You could almost hear the knives
being whetted. My partner, Jim Rawls, stood up, and he is a tall man
so it takes him a while to stand, but before he was fully erect, Judge
Tjoflat asked: "How can this possibly be constitutional?" Well, it was
a purely rhetorical question because Jim did not get to answer it for
about ten minutes. We knew coming out of oral argument we had lost
on Canon 7. It was just a matter of how badly we lost. We tried to tell
ourselves that we would just lose on that one aspect and everything
would be okay.
MS. CUSTER: That is what they told the client.

14.

926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991).
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MR. SCHROEDER: After oral argument, White came down, and then
we knew we were in big trouble. Two months after White was decided,
the Weaver v. Bonner Eleventh Circuit decision was issued. It adopted
probably the two most damaging aspects of the decision in White. It
adopted Justice Scalia's suggestion that there was absolutely no
distinction between judicial races and legislative and executive races and
that you could not hold judges to a higher standard as far as their
speech was concerned. On that basis, the Eleventh Circuit panel ruled
that the negligence standard of Canon 7(b)(1)(d) was clearly unconstitutional and that you have to apply the actual malice standard, which is
applicable in other elections.
The court also embraced Justice O'Connor's concurrence, which was
basically "you reap what you sow." If you are going to have elections,
you have to deal with all the bad stuff that comes with elections, and
you cannot control it more so than other elections. It was that sweeping
language going forward that was a big concern. What other canons were
going to fall based on that rationale?
We quickly found out which ones. Canon 7(b)(2)'s ban of personal
solicitations was unconstitutional because the remedy that the state had
devised, which was that campaign committees could solicit support
instead of the personal solicitation, was really just a sham because the
judge would know what was going on. The court also struck as
unconstitutional the ban on personal solicitation of money. That was a
big surprise for us because we were never able to brief that question.
We never argued it, and it never came up in oral argument. So that was
a big surprise.
MS. CUSTER: But neither did Mr. Weaver, though.
MR. SCHROEDER: Right. It was not even attacked by plaintiff. So
that was a sua sponte strike down. On JQC Rule 27, it was a curious
approach. The panel adopted an argument that had not been made by
the plaintiff and ruled that the cease and desist request was not really
a request. It was actually an order, and thus, the panel analyzed it
under prior restraint rules. There is a heavy presumption against prior
restraints, and if you do analyze it as a cease and desist order, I agree
it is unconstitutional. I just think the word "request" was clear and
meant what it said: "it was a request and not an order."
The panel did not address the speech component of Rule 27, whether
the Rule 27 "Public Statement" itself was unconstitutional, or whether
the JQC can or cannot speak. Judge Hunt's decision is still the existing
law on the "Public Statement," and he ruled that speech by the JQC
Rule 27 Committee in a campaign is constitutional.

832

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

That decision was issued. We filed for a review en banc by the whole
Eleventh Circuit. There was much concern among state court justice
groups at that time and we had several amici briefs filed. The en banc
request, however, was denied. So that is where we stood at the
beginning of 2003.
MS. CUSTER: Yes. After we were denied a full court hearing by the
Eleventh Circuit, we were looking down the pike at the 2004 elections.
And funny enough, Justice Sears was up for re-election again as were
several other statewide races, not to mention all the judicial circuit
races.
The Commission was given a charge by the supreme court to rewrite
Canon 7 and rewrite Rule 27 in light of White and in light of our Weaver
decision because we wanted to again have in place whatever we could
concerning judicial elections as a canon and a rule. We sat down and
tried to craft a canon and a rule that we thought would fit under both
of those holdings at this point and would be constitutional.
We sent it to the supreme court in May 2003. At that point, the
supreme court began to review it. There was some public interest in our
new Canon and our new rule, so the supreme court opened it up for
public statements. The state bar actually made a formal statement to
the supreme court on some ideas that they wanted included, even though
there were issues that perhaps we could not make part of the Canon, but
that we needed to make very clear in Georgia we cared about.
So how were we going to do that? There was a preamble to the Code
of Judicial Conduct. It was an aspirational preamble, as most preambles
are. Based on that preamble, you can imagine as lawyers how you feel
about the fact that a sitting judge can now personally solicit you for
funds. That was scary. And let me tell you, I have already been
It is
through this election this year, and you should be scared.
happening, it has happened, and it will happen. I don't know what
Judge Tjoflat was thinking other than he gets to stay where he is forever
and ever and ever, amen, but it is happening and although it has not
had horrible dire consequences, it has had consequences.
I would like just to read you the little provisions that we added, again
merely aspirational, that are now in the preamble. The mandatory
provisions of the canons and sections describe the basic minimal ethical
requirements of judicial conduct. When I teach the judges, we go over
that sentence over and over again. The Code of Judicial Conduct is
Judges and
supposed to be the minimum acceptable standard.
even
standards
highest
ethical
the
strive
to
achieve
candidates should
if not required by this Code. As an example, a judge or candidate is
permitted under Canon 7, section B, to solicit campaign funds directly
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from potential donors. The commentary, which is actually in the body
of the Canon, however, makes clear that the judge or candidate who
wishes to exceed the minimal ethical requirements could choose to set
up a campaign committee to raise and solicit contributions. This Code
is intended to state only basic standards that should govern the conduct
of all judges and guide and assist judges in establishing and maintaining
high standards of judicial and personal conduct.
So that is where we stand today. We have a new Canon 7 that allows
you to solicit funds personally and allows judicial candidates to solicit
endorsements personally. We have a different standard of how we will
review campaign complaints and what those complaints are. Unfortunately, the work of the Commission continues to remain confidential and
will remain confidential. Perhaps at some point in the future I can give
you some statistics. Did we have election complaints this summer and
are we having some now? Yes. Have we spoken publicly? No, we have
not. Are the issues that have been raised this year changed from the
last election? Sometimes. When a complaint has been made, and we
ask the judge for a response, the response has been to say, "See White;
see Weaver v. Bonner," period. "I'm going to do what I want to do,"
because that's what they think White says.
MS. REED: Exactly.
MS. CUSTER: And that is exactly what Barbara was telling you.
That is what they say. The Christian Coalition did create one of the
questionnaires in Georgia, and it literally says, "You have to answer this
because White says you have to answer this and if you do not answer
this questionnaire, we are going to tell everybody you are not capable of
even answering a questionnaire, much less being a judge."
Are there any questions or are you all just so depressed by this whole
bit of information?
PROFESSOR LONGAN: Cheryl, let me ask one question, and then
we will open it up to the audience. We know that Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White was about the announce clause, but we also know
that there is language in Justice Scalia's opinion and much more directly
in Weaver v. Bonner that would lead us to be concerned about more than
just the announce clause, and in particular to be concerned about the
constitutionality of the commitment clause. So my question to the panel,
and any of you can take this, is whether the commitment clause is
constitutional?
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MS. REED: Well, my take on it is that it is. I think Cheryl made a
very important point in saying that much of this is aspirational. But,
as a practical matter, when I was admitted to the bar, which happened
to be in the state of New York, I had to go into that courtroom and raise
my right hand. In addition to pledging to uphold the Constitution of the
United States and the laws of the state of New York, it was abundantly
clear to me as a new lawyer that I was trading away certain rights and
freedoms that non-lawyers had to behave in certain ways for the
privilege, not the right, but the privilege, of being a lawyer.
Well, what is a judge but a lawyer to the nth degree? I think that
there is a very valid argument for saying that certainly we are going to
hold lawyers to higher standards on certain issues and certain types of
behaviors. Certainly we can hold judges to higher standards. Being a
judge by itself is not a right. You do have to earn it, or you should have
to earn it. I think it is perfectly valid to place certain types of restrictions on what judges may and may not do in the service of what I find
to be greater compelling state interests.
Now, as a practical matter, is this going to be attacked? Absolutely.
I do not think that all of these issues are going to be resolved anytime
soon. I think every single aspect of these issues is going to be litigated.
The pledges or promises clause is going to be litigated, and I do not
think it is going to be resolved until the Supreme Court rules on it. The
commit clause is not going to be resolved until the Supreme Court rules
on it. Political activity, personal solicitation, and all of these issues are
going to have to go that high for us to have a resolution.
Now, as a practical matter, Justice Scalia also said that the Court was
not explicitly addressing the commit or pledges or promises clauses.
That said, there is plenty of dicta in that decision that looks like laying
the groundwork for a future case to overturn this.
Now, the dicta in White is being presented by people who have a
vested interest in forcing judges and judicial candidates to take very
public positions on specific issues. It is being presented as the holding.
This is the entire holding of White: "The Minnesota Supreme Court's
Canon of judicial conduct prohibiting candidates for judicial election
from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues
violates the First Amendment." That is what White says. There is not
a word about what judicial candidates have to do in terms of what they
have to say. But this has certainly been hijacked as Cheryl and Eric
both pointed out, taking this whole thing and expanding it beyond all
recognition.
MR. SCHROEDER: My take on it is probably a little bit more
depressing. My take is, who cares? If they can announce their views on
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disputed legal and political issues but cannot commit, the difference is
that he cannot say, "I am going to rule in favor of Georgia Power every
time they come before me." What he can say instead is, "I'm going to
rule in favor of power corporations." You could send fairly definite,
precise signals to the electorate promising how you are going to rule in
a narrow factual setting, and that is what this seems to allow. The
announce clause tried to prevent those word games and insure the
impartiality of our judges or the appearance of impartiality.
However, I do think the commit and promise clauses are all going to
be held constitutional. A "promise" to rule a particular way strikes at
the heart of a litigant's right to due process. The tension will be in
deciding what is an "announcement" and what is a "promise."
MS. CUSTER: I think we should all remember that the election
canon, which is Canon 7, does not stand alone. It is the seventh canon
in our entire Code of Judicial Conduct. If I am asked by lay people in
the public what the Code of Judicial Conduct is, and what it is trying to
do, I would explain that it is an aspirational set of rules for judges
explaining to them that we, meaning the people, expect our judges to be
fair and impartial every single time. That is what is expected of the
judiciary in Georgia.
MS. REED: If I can go back just for a minute to something Eric said.
You mentioned that, and in a way you are right, it is almost more
insidious with the signaling that goes on rather than saying explicitly
in such and such a case that I will rule this way and it is code. But,
really, as a practical matter, we already have that. Somebody in here
tell me when you have heard a judicial candidate run his or her
campaign on the grounds that "I will be a judicial activist." Anyone?
That is what I thought. But how many of you have heard someone say,
"I am a strict constructionist," or "I will interpret the Constitution
according to what it says," or "I will not legislate from the bench?" We
have that. We have judges who say, "I agree frivolous lawsuits are a
problem," or, "Yes, I think we need to look at tort reform," and what does
that tell you? For those constituencies, they are not saying this just to
hear themselves talk. Well, there may be some of that too, but the
reason they are saying this is to appeal to very specific constituencies
who they know will turn out the votes for them. Words like that are a
code, so when an "X" type of case comes before me, what I want you to
think right now anyway is that you are more likely to get decision "Y"
or decision "Z."
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PROFESSOR LONGAN: I think we have time for one question from
the audience. I would like to recognize Bill Weisenberg from the Ohio
State Bar Association.
MR. WEISENBERG: Judges have been telegraphing their signals for
years and years. To me, the White case really did not do much because
they have been doing it anyway. The question I have in Georgia is this:
What percentage of the judges are actually soliciting money directly?
MS. CUSTER: I would have no way of knowing that.
MR. WEISENBERG: Maybe I am just a cynic on this and have been
around politics too much, but whether it is a committee or not, the
judges know where the money is coming from.
MS. CUSTER: Yes.
MR. WEISENBERG: Okay. When they go to a political event, their
enemies normally are not there, their friends are there, so they know
where the money is coming from. Is there anything wrong with a state
committee saying, "We disagree with the decision of the court and we do
not believe you should raise money" and say it very loud and clear?
Your preamble does that.
MS. CUSTER: No, no. It is even more than that. In the commentary, we actually highly recommend you not do this and set up a
competent committee.
We say, you are encouraged to establish
campaign committees of responsible persons who perhaps will not steal
your money to secure and manage the expenditure of funds for your
candidacy. We did as much as we felt like we could do.
MR. WEISENBERG: I guess the point I am making is that I do not
believe that most of the judges I know directly solicit money. But when
they go out to visit corporations and law firms, they are not there
because they have nothing else to do.
MS. CUSTER: No.
MR. WEISENBERG: So, it is by indirection, and in elective states
that is going to be the rule. But I think what really would be interesting
as a follow-up to this event is a canvassing of judges, maybe some
private conversations, asking them if they are out there raising money
directly or if they use a committee? How do they personally feel? My
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senses tell me that the majority of judges are not going to go knocking
on doors for money because most of them do not want to do it anyway.
MS. CUSTER: No.
MR. WEISENBERG: They have never liked doing it.
MS. CUSTER: No. Well, there was this dichotomy before that was
very hard to swallow, and if you are a sitting judge in Georgia you have
heard me talk about it before. You were always told that you could not
personally solicit money. You could not even be in the room when they
were soliciting other people for money for you, when your committee was
in the room. I used to use the joke, "Elvis must leave the building while
they are shaking the people down for their money." But the minute it
was over, you and your friends could sit at the table and say Eric only
gave $25. Then the judges were encouraged to write thank you notes for
the money that they received. Now we get to the question, "How can
you tell me I can know who gave me money, know how much they gave
me, and you are telling me I probably should thank them for the money,
yet I cannot ask them for the money?" But that was the way the rule
was.
This at least changes that. But I still think that many judges do not
want the hundred dollar handshake in the hallway of the courthouse.
If you have a lay person who walks by and sees you and says, "Hey, I
just want to give you a little something"-and in Georgia people still like
to personally hand money to candidates-that would be a little bit
harder to explain.
MR. SCHROEDER: I do not think any of us are suggesting that this
is something that is common place. It is the outlier judge who sets a bad
example to make it appear that everyone is doing it, and I think that is
the concern.
PROFESSOR LONGAN: Thank you all.

(SESSION CONCLUDED)

